1
It is this comparison that I want to discuss here, for the 'relations' of which he here writes include recognition as a central case; so Hegel's comment suggests that the 'individuality', i.e. the independence, of a state depends on recognition by other states in the way in which the moral status of someone as a person depends on recognition by other persons.
Recognition among persons is a prominent theme of contemporary moral and political theory, and the significance of recognition among states is a staple topic of international law. But the two issues are not often connected. Nonetheless, in both cases there is a question about the relationship between recognition and autonomy, be it personal or political, and I shall argue that by comparing the two cases we can get a clearer view about this relationship.
2. The first point that needs discussion here is the concept of recognition itself. The simplest cases of recognition are those in which one recognises a person (Bill), a place (New York), a kind (ash trees) etc. -object-recognition, as I shall call it. Objectrecognition is perceptual and implies knowing who or what the item is, though the converse implication does not hold: I know who Xerxes was, but I am not in a position to recognise him because I lack any even indirect perceptual knowledge of him. This kind of Thomas Baldwin Recognition: personal and political 2 recognition is an exercise of memory which draws on previous experience: I re-cognise someone with whom I have been previously acquainted or whose appearance is familiar from photographs and similar images. Because object-recognition is conceptual as well as perceptual it typically involves propositional recognition: in recognising New York I recognise that I have been there before or something similar. This recognition is an exercise of memory -I remember that I was there before. But not all propositional recognition is of this kind: if I am discussing a sensitive matter with someone I may recognise that what I am saying is likely to distress them. Plainly, recognising that this is the case is not remembering it; instead recognition here is primarily an awareness of the significance of my remarks which draws on my memory of similar situations. Recognition of this kind is not, however, simply an exercise of memory; it can involve significant inferences, as when we are invited to use our experience of others in order to recognise faults of our own of which we were not previously aware.
This last case introduces a further aspect of recognition. The point of getting us to recognise our own faults is typically to motivate us to do something appropriate, to make what amends we can to those whom we have harmed and to change our ways for the future. Hence recognition is often not just a matter of realising the significance of what has been said or done; it often includes a response which confirms the value judgment inherent in one's realisation. This kind of evaluative recognition is paradigmatically exemplified by acts which involve the award of a prize or a punishment. Thus the Nobel Prize committee awarded the 1998 prize for Economics to Amartya Sen in recognition of his achievements in this field; and a judge may impose a severe sentence on an offender in order to recognise the seriousness of the offence he has committed. But there is a very wide range of acts which constitute a form of evaluative recognition. It may be just a speech-act, such as an apology or thanks or praise; or it may be something more tangible, Thomas Baldwin Recognition: personal and political 3 such as a prize or penalty; or, again, it may be a long-term change in status, such as promotion or demotion. In all these cases the presumption is that the response is an act which is deserved in the light of that which is being recognised, -an achievement, an offensive remark or whatever. But there are other cases where the question of desert does not arise. For example where companies are competing in a free market, if one company lowers its prices and others recognise a threat to their market share, they may well lower their own prices as a response. This response is explained and justified by the competitive situation of the market, but it is not strictly speaking deserved, since there is no question here of entitlements (though the competitors may say that the first company to lower its prices 'got what it deserved' if it is driven out of the market by them). Similarly, if we are playing chess and I recognise your move as a potential threat to my position, I will try to respond in a way which counters your threat; but my response is not to be thought of as deserved by your threat. If, however, you go on to defeat me and thereby win the chess competition in which we are engaged you may well deserve a prize in recognition of your victory.
In these cases where the response is not deserved, the response is a reaction to the agent's assessment of the situation but it does not just confirm that this recognition of its significance; instead it is typically an attempt to modify the situation so that a perceived threat is countered or something similar. I shall call cases of this kind 'reactive recognition'. By contrast where a response is thought of as deserved, its role is in part that of a public affirmation of an evaluation by an agent who is authorised to deliver this response; hence it is through responses of this kind that we give public recognition to the value of the acts that are recognised, and these acts, such as prize-giving or punishment, are often symbolic or expressive as well as instrumental. In these latter cases, therefore, the response is internal to the evaluative recognition, and I shall henceforth restrict the Thomas Baldwin Recognition: personal and political 4 phrase 'evaluative recognition' to cases of this kind since it is primarily through evaluative recognition of this kind that recognition looks as though it may have something distinctive to contribute to moral and political theory. A good example here concerns the sense in which same sex couples 'seek recognition'. They do not just seek to promote knowledge about their long-term relationships, nor do they seek to provoke a reactive response to this knowledge. Instead they seek evaluative recognition from the legislature of their relationships as deserving a change in the law which would give them the same legal status as relationships between persons of different sexes.
Thus there are three aspects to evaluative recognition: first, knowledge of relevant facts, typically concerning someone's actions; second, an evaluation of these actions; third, a response by an agent with the appropriate authority which is thought of as deserved by the actions evaluated. In some cases the response is mandatory, as where a student who has accumulated most marks in some subject is awarded a prize in recognition of this achievement; in most cases, as with the award of a Nobel prize or with legislative changes, the act is discretionary, and it is in these latter cases that evaluative recognition most clearly adds something of significance to the situation evaluated. One can have the first two aspects of evaluative recognition, the evaluation of action, without the third, the response -as when someone is considered for an award but does not receive it; but it would be strange in such a case to speak of the person receiving recognition, unless, perhaps, the consideration takes the form of a public short-list (as with book prizes), where the publication of the short-list itself counts as a response, and thus as a modest form of authoritative recognition. But there is clearly no impropriety in evaluating an action without doing anything at all as a result, where the action is not specially remarkable; and in that way one can recognise the value of an action without responding to it.
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Evaluative recognition is factive: one cannot gain recognition for something one has not done, even from those who mistakenly think that one has done it. In this respect therefore evaluative recognition is like knowledge; indeed it includes knowledge of the facts whose value is recognised. But evaluative recognition is not just a matter of knowledge of what has been done and of its merits or faults, since it is accomplished by an act, such as the award of a prize, which is a response to the value of the actions recognised. Curiously, we do have the verb 'to acknowledge', which sounds like a kind of knowledge, but actually has much the same sense as 'to recognise': thus one can acknowledge someone's achievements by the award of a prize, though acknowledgment is often a less formal response than recognition. So despite its etymology, acknowledgment is not a kind of knowledge either, although, like recognition, it includes knowledge of the facts acknowledged. Exactly what Hegel has in mind at this stage of his argument is notoriously difficult to understand. He allows that there is a form of purely subjective self-consciousness which is antecedent to mutual recognition; what mutual recognition is supposed to add is consciousness of one's objective existence as a subject in virtue of one's recognition that someone else, another subject whom one recognises as such, recognises one as a subject.
Hegel holds, however, that this mutual recognition is not easily achieved; the pursuit of recognition leads first to the master/slave dialectic and only subsequently, after the evolution of political society, to mutual recognition of the right kind.
To understand what is going on here we have to see that Hegel takes it that objectivity is here primarily is a matter of autonomy (selbständingkeit 6 ), which includes a normative claim to the effect that one is worthy of respect as an autonomous moral subject. Hence the type of recognition sought here is evaluative. Hegel argues, however, that recognition of the existence of others initially takes the form of a potentially deadly struggle which is a response to the recognition that, in the proverbial state of nature, others are a threat to one's own existence. 7 Thus mutual recognition is initially an extreme form of reactive recognition, a Hobbesian state of war, which comes to an end when the parties to it accept a social hierarchy in which the 'master's' authority over the 'slave' is recognised -i.e. a Hobbesian 'commonwealth by acquisition' is established. This form of political society does not, however, provide for either side the kind of evaluative recognition of autonomy which was initially sought. This is obvious as far as the slavish subject's situation is concerned; but Hegel's insight is that the sovereign master's autonomy is equally not recognised by means of his slavish subjects' submission to him, The legitimate authority of a state .... is partly a purely domestic matter. On the other hand, however, it is no less essential that this authority should receive its full and final legitimation through its recognition by other states, although this recognition requires to be safeguarded by the proviso that where a state is to be recognized by others, it shall likewise recognise them, i.e. respect their autonomy. and equally that what we get from friendship is 'basic self-confidence', as he puts it.
Hence friendship can be regarded as a form of evaluative recognition, and although it is less formal and authoritative than the other types, unlike them it is straightforwardly reciprocal. Honneth places love alongside friendship in this category, and many of the same points apply here: lovers do indeed confer a privileged status on each other as a unique foundation of their happiness, and there are acts, such as the exchange of gifts, whereby they signify to each other their recognition of this status. But in this case, unlike friendship, there is also the possibility of moving on to formal recognition of the relationship, by marriage or civil association -in effect combining Honneth's first two patterns of relationship ('love' and 'law').
5. Honneth's Hegelian thesis is that these different forms of recognition make possible different levels of autonomy for an agent, what he identifies as the practical 'relations-toself' in his schema -basic self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. Kantians may well object that our fundamental moral autonomy is not socially constituted in these ways; instead, they hold, it is a fundamental implication of the capacity for rational choice.
Rawls expressed this position in his claim that to be morally autonomous is to be 'a selforiginating source of valid claims'; 13 for the thesis that the valid claims one makes are Reasonable persons, we say, are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others. The Law of Peoples, as I have sketched it, simply extends these same ideas to the political Society of well-ordered Peoples. For that law, which settles fundamental political questions as they arise for the Society of Peoples, must also be based on a public political conception of justice. 20 Since, as we have seen, reciprocity is central to Rawls's political conception of justice, it is no surprise that he also applies it to the Law of Peoples:
Thus, the criterion of reciprocity applies to the Law of Peoples in the same way it does to the principles of justice for a constitutional regime. This reasonable sense of due respect' among them which make it possible for them to work together as equal free members of international society.
6. This account of the role of recognition in international affairs contrasts with more ambitious positions which accord it a constitutive role whereby a 'people' acquires the status of a state through international recognition. Intuitively, some such position seems correct. Take a new state such as, say, East Timor: antecedent to its recognition, on the face of it, there was no such state, but following recognition by international organisations such as the United Nations East Timor is now regarded as a state. Hence it appears that this kind of international recognition is an act which confers international status and, therefore, one would think, is an act which constitutes a 'people' as a state with a territory.
But critics of this constitutive view hold that it overstates the significance of international recognition. While not disputing that recognition here is evaluative, an act which confers status, the critics maintain that this act is essentially just 'declaratory':
international recognition is just a public declaration that the conditions for existence as an autonomous state have been met, thereby enabling the putative state to take its place within the international system. 22 As such international recognition is comparable to the award of a degree to a student who has passed his exams and met the other conditions for graduation. The award of the degree is a 'declaration' that these conditions have been satisfied and enables the student to present himself to others, potential employers for example, as a graduate. But the award of the degree does not have a constitutive role in the student's degree: it was the student's academic record which entitled him to the award of a degree. Similarly, then, on the declaratory view of international recognition, recognition has a ceremonial role, but the grounds for being recognised as a state are constituted by other conditions which do not involve recognition.
The key thesis here is this last one, that there are conditions not themselves requiring international recognition whose satisfaction by a people entitles them to international recognition. It is this thesis which is rejected on the constitutive view, according to which, on the contrary, the conditions whereby a people is entitled to be the result that these people were likely to become stateless refugees, the international community might well intervene to ensure that these people are able to enjoy full rights as citizens. In practice the issue here connects with the question of territory, for it may be that the best solution to political divisions within a population is secession, as has happened in effect with respect to Kosovo. But the important point is that citizenship cannot be an exclusively internal matter; it is not acceptable that large groups of people should be stateless and there is therefore is a role for the international community in ensuring that the existing state system encompasses everyone. The clear case, however, where the international community has a constitutive role even with respect to established states concerns territorial boundaries. For territorial boundaries between states are obviously not a matter internal to any one of them. In some cases they are settled by negotiations between the states directly involved, and no further international involvement is required; but frequently this is not the case, especially where a new state is created following secession, and external international adjudication is needed. This point does, of course, depend on there being a plurality of states with territorial boundaries, and an imaginary situation in which there was just one world-state on earth would be one in which this point did not apply. But that is not our world; nor is it one that critics of the constitutive role of international recognition should wish for since this imagined hypothesis would assign much greater authority to the government of the imagined world state concerning the demarcation of internal boundaries between the peoples of this one state than is assigned to the international community by those who give international recognition a constitutive role.
Thus there is a strong case for accepting that international recognition has a constitutive role with respect to the determination of territorial boundaries and also, to process is to be implemented in a peaceful way is never going to be easy, for the application of international law in these areas is never going to be a straightforward determination of entitlements. Decisions and resolutions are often controversial and contested, with losers as well as winners: but it is only by means of them that international legitimacy can be sustained -as the constitutive theory of recognition maintains.
7. This conclusion in effect affirms a Hegelian account of the role of recognition in international affairs, to the effect that a state's authority with respect to its people and territory, and thus its autonomy, 'receives its full and final legitimation through its recognition by other states'. 25 Thus the issue that remains to be settled is whether, as Hegel suggested in the passage from which I started, recognition has a similar constitutive role with respect to individual personal autonomy. Unreflectively, the cases appear very different. Recognition has a constitutive role in international affairs primarily because the state is an artifice, an 'Artificiall Man' in Hobbes's phrase, 26 and thus lacks any natural rights. By contrast individual persons are not artificial and are often taken to have natural, or fundamental human, rights. One sign of this difference is that whereas recognition in international affairs is a familiar actual procedure, there is no similar procedure by which the autonomy of an individual is officially recognised.
But it would be too quick to rely on simple contrasts of this kind. In considering the question further, a good case to start with is self-respect, whose importance is indicated by Rawls's thesis that self-respect is the most important of personal goods. 27 Honneth took self-respect to be the 'practical relation to self', the mode of self-concern, which is characteristic of the level of autonomy made possible by the legal recognition of rights, and one can formulate a Hegelian thesis concerning the constitution of self-respect by adapting Hegel's aphorism concerning self-consciousness to the case of self-respect:
Self-respect exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only insofar as one is oneself respected by another whom one respects oneself.
Intuitively there does seem to be something right about this claim; yet it is not true that self-respect is in all cases dependent upon being respected by others whom one respects oneself. One can develop and retain a strong sense of the worth of one's life despite the fact that one receives little or no respect from others. The classic case here is Olaudah Equiano, the African slave who retained his self-respect despite the total lack of respect he received from his masters. 28 What is true here is that because the value of an individual is the ground of claims on others, self-respect includes the thought that one is worthy of respect by others; and from this it follows that self-respect is best realised through relationships of mutual respect between people -which is the truth inherent in the Hegelian thesis. But this truth is not a truth about the constitution of self-respect; instead it is one about the norm inherent in its realisation. Hence in this regard our autonomy is confirmed, but not constituted, through recognition by others by means of relationships and institutions in which one's worth is evaluatively recognised by others.
This case is, I think, typical. For personal autonomy is fundamentally the capacity for making a life of one's own, and this is not on the face of it dependent upon recognition by others, although it does involve a normative claim concerning treatment by others which anticipates their recognition of this capacity. This complexity is captured by Rawls's characterisation of autonomy as the status of one who is a 'self-originating source of valid claims', in that the capacity which is the 'source' of the claims we make on others is not dependent on recognition by them although the 'valid' normative claims themselves are claims to recognition. But there remains a question as to quite how the basis of this validity is to be conceived, in particular whether it is contingent upon some form of social recognition. Since this is, in effect, a question about the basis of moral norms, it is not possible or sensible to address it comprehensively here. Honneth's Hegelian approach makes morality contingent upon the forms of recognition inherent in existing practices,
and this is open to the objection that it does not leave sufficient space for moral norms which call for the critical appraisal of existing practices as unjust or worse. An intuitionist approach which just relies on rational intuitions of fundamental moral truths avoids this problem but faces familiar objections of its own, not the least of which, in this context at least, is that it significantly compromises the understanding of an agent's moral autonomy. 29 But Rawls's 'Kantian constructivism' offers an attractive way forward here.
For Rawls's thesis that moral norms are requirements of practical reason applied to social practices which address the circumstances of human life combines the intuitionist's appeal to reason with the Hegelian's emphasis on the importance of social practices while avoiding the main objections to both these alternative approaches to the foundations of morality.
Thus in the end it is, I think, Rawls who identifies the proper place for recognition in moral theory, according to which it is not constitutive of a person's autonomy but, in an idealised reflexive form, fundamental to the determination of morality. Rawls's Kantian constructivist grounds the validity of putative moral norms on the rules of practices and institutions which, as rational and reasonable persons, we would agree to impose upon ourselves in situations in which all participants recognise each other as free and equal.
One might object that just as for Rawls this agreement, or contract, is merely hypothetical, so too, on this account of the matter, is recognition; and just as it is notoriously difficult to explain the significance of a merely hypothetical social contract, it is going to be equally hard to attach importance to hypothetical acts of recognition. But in fact the cases are not similar. For whereas the Rawlsian social contract remains inherently hypothetical and its significance is best understood as an informal expression of the method of Kantian constructivism, the practical realisation of the requirements of morality, or justice, brings with it actual mutual recognition. Where the constitutional and legal principles of a state accord with principles of justice, the institutions of the state are actual, and not merely hypothetical, ways of realising the mutual evaluative recognition among citizens of each other as free and equal. 
